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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kevin John Nielsen timely appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation. On appeal, Mr. Nielsen argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him
due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various
transcripts he requested to be created at the public's expense. Mr. Nielsen also argues
that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation and denied his oral
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting sentence reduction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In docket number 39656 (hereinafter, older case), Mr. Nielsen was charged, by
Information, with four counts of grand theft by possession of stolen property and one
count of possession of a controlled substance.

(R., pp.41-43.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Mr. Nielsen pleaded guilty to three counts of grand theft by possession of
stolen property and, in return, the State dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.5055.)

The district court then imposed three concurrent unified sentences of fourteen

years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.63-65.) Upon review of
Mr. Nielsen's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court
suspended the sentences and placed Mr. Nielsen on probation. (R., pp.70-74.)
In docket number 39628 (hereinafter, new case), Mr. Nielsen was charged, by
Information, with possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor charge of
driving without privileges. (R., pp.301-302.) These new charges were also submitted to
the district court as a probation violation in the older case. (R., pp.91-93.) In addition to
the new charge, the State also alleged that Mr. Nielsen violated various terms of his
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probation in the older case. (R., pp.91-93.) In the older case, Mr. Nielsen admitted to
violating the terms of his probation for driving without privileges, driving without
obtaining a driver's license, and possessing a controlled substance.
148.)

(R., pp.91-93,

In the newer case Mr. Nielsen pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled

substance, and the remaining charge was dismissed. (R., pp.340.)
At a global sentencing/probation disposition hearing, the district court revoked
probation in the older case and, in the newer case, imposed a concurrent unified
sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.154-155, 359-370.) However,
the district court retained jurisdiction in both cases. (R., pp.154-155, 359-370.) Upon
review of Mr. Nielsen's rider, the district court placed Mr. Nielsen on probation.
(R., pp.162-165, 374-375.)
After a period of probation, the State filed two motions for probation violation in
both cases.

(R., pp.183-185, 395-397)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Nielsen

admitted to violating the terms of his probation for using methamphetamine on multiple
occasions, in both cases. (R., pp.183-185, 209-211,395-397,413-415.) The district
court found that Mr. Nielsen was in violation of his probation agreements, but reinstated
Mr. Nielsen's probation. (R., pp.212-213, 416-417.)
After a period of probation, the State filed two motions for probation violation in
each case and an amended motion for probation violation in the older case. (R., pp.215218,225-229, 419-422.)

Mr. Nielsen admitted to violating the terms of both his

probation agreements for failing to comply with treatment recommendations, committing
the misdemeanor crime of driving under the influence of alcohol, consuming or
possessing alcohol on multiple occasions, failing to notify his supervisor about contact
with law enforcement, frequenting an establishment where alcohol is the primary source
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of income, and failing to complete a treatment program. (R., pp.226-228, 237-238, 419422, 438-439.) At the probation violation disposition hearing Mr. Nielsen requested the
district court reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35.

(R., pp.240, 440; 02/02/12

Tr., p.20, Ls.3-18.) Thereafter, the district court revoked probation in both cases and
executed the underlying sentences without a reduction.

(R., pp.241-242, 441-442.)

Mr. Nielsen timely appealed in both cases. (R., pp.244-246, 444-446.)
Mr. Nielsen then filed an untimely Rule 35 motion in the newer case, which was
denied by the district court. 1 (R., pp.448-458, 472-473.)
On appeal, Mr. Nielsen's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record
with various transcripts and an addendum to the presentence report.

(Motion to

Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof
(hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) The State objected to Mr. Nielsen's request
for the transcripts but not the addendum to the presentence report. (Objection in Part to
"Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
Thereof' (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho
Supreme Court entered an order denying Mr. Nielsen's request for the transcripts but
granting his request for the addendum to the presentence report.

(Order Denying

Motion to Augment the Record in Part and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule
(hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)

1

Mr. Nielsen is not challenging the denial of his Rule 35 motion on appeal.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Nielsen due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Nielsen's
probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Nielsen's oral Rule
35 motion requesting leniency?

4

ARGUMENT
/.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Nielsen Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appe"ate Record With Necessary Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Nielsen filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcript of the
entry of plea hearing, held on October 14, 2004, the sentencing hearing held on
December 02, 2004, the sentence hearing, held on February 3, 2005, the rider review
hearing, held on July 28, 2005, the admit/deny and entry of plea hearing, held on
September 10, 2007, the rider review hearing, held on April 3, 2008, and the
dispositional hearing, held on May 6, 2010.
Supreme Court.

Those requests were denied by the

On appeal, Mr. Nielsen is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's
Mr. Nielsen asserts that the requested

denial of his request for the transcripts.

transcripts are relevant to the issues of whether the district court abused its discretion in
revoking probation and denying his oral Rule 35 motion because the district court could
rely on its memory of the requested hearing when it revoked probation. Therefore, the
Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his requests.
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B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Nielsen Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With
The Necessary Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Nielsen With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appe"ate
Review Of His Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CONST.
art. I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamenta"y fair."
Lassiter v. Deparlment of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

V.

Wood,

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh

V.

State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex rei. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).

In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
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"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appel/ate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appel/ate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." !d. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." !d.
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeaL" Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." !d. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. /d. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

/d. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. /d.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29,34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
10

(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Nielsen fails to
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Nielsen's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested item, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceeding was before the district court
at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the
transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge
gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho

367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
11

to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
decision to revoke probation.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No 39057,2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 1.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the

terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 1-2.

After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on

probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and
the district court revoked probation.

The defendant appealed from the district

Id.

court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4.
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point
12

this case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Mr. Nielsen is challenging
not only the order revoking probation, but also the length of his sentence, which entails
an analysis of the district court's sentencing rationale.
Additionally, the requested item is within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The requested transcript is relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all
proceedings

following

sentencing

when

appropriate sentencing determinations.

determining

whether the

court

made

See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,

28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following

a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2 "Where an appeal is taken from an
order refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35, [the Appellate Court's] scope of
review includes all information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the

In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in
Hanington. Specifically it held:
2

In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and
Mr. Nielsen is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.

13

subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189
(Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added). Since Mr. Nielsen is challenging the denial of his
oral rule 35 motion, Arazia, holds that the original sentencing hearings in this matter
need to be reviewed in this appeal.
Further support for Mr. Nielsen's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery
in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial.

Id. The Court of Appeals

addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide the original Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the original sentencing
hearing.

Id.

Even though the original sentence was not on appeal, and happened

years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript
was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error.

Moreover, there was no

indication that a transcript of that hearing was created before the probation violation
hearing or that the district court referenced the original sentencing hearing at the
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probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed
that the original sentencing hearing would address the nature of the original offense.
Had Mr. Nelsien failed to request the transcript at issue, the Warren opinion indicates
that it would be presumed to support the district court's decision to execute the original
sentence.
Furthermore, the transcripts of the sentencing hearing held on December 2, 2004
and the continued sentencing hearing held on February 3, 2005, are necessary
because Mr. Nielsen objected to the contents of the PSI. Specifically, the minutes of
the December 2, 2004, sentencing hearing indicate that there were some discrepancies
in the "PSI letter" and trial counsel asserted that Mr. Nielsen was in a funeral in
Minnesota.

(R., p.57.)

The district court then questioned presentence investigator.

(R., p.57.) Mr. Nielsen and somebody named George Gunn commented.

(R., pp.57-

58.) The district court then continued the sentencing hearing. (R., pp.57-58.) At the
continued sentencing hearing held on February 3, 2005, trial counsel stated that there
were errors in the PSI. (R., p.61.) Without access to transcripts of these two hearings
this Court and appellate counsel will not know what objections to the PSI were made.
Moreover, there is no way to determine the content of either Mr. Nielsen's or Mr. Gunn's
comments to the district court.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Nielsen's request for the transcripts
will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing
transcript supports the district court's sentencing decisions.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the review of Mr. Nielsen's appellate sentencing claims on the merits,
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and therefore, Mr. neilsen should either be provided with the requested transcripts or
the presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Nielsen With
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[to] hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to,
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" /d. at 71-72.
In Doug/as v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Doug/as was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Doug/as that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
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has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Nielsen has not obtained
review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
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the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Nielsen on the
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Nielsen is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Nielsen his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Nielsen's Probation
Mr. Nielsen asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation. When a defendant appeals from an order
revoking probation the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework:
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987).
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State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137,1138 (Ct. App. 1989).

Mr. Nielsen concedes that he violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly, he
only contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation.

"A district court's

decision to revoke probation wi" not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the
court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a
district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923
(Ct. App. 2003).

"In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate

response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal
of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of
society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001).
Mr. Nielsen argues that the district court should have placed him on probation so
he could participate in the Ada County Drug Court program. Mr. Nielsen was accepted
into the Ada County drug court program. (02/02/12 Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.8, L.2.) At the
probation violation disposition hearing, Mr. Nielsen's trial counsel made the following
statements:
In terms of the evaluation for Drug Court, those folks have certainly
extensive experience determining whether someone's just telling them
something they want to hear, whether the person's actually sincere. In
this case, they certainly deemed him as somebody that they would
consider letting in the program if Your Honor [would] put him in the
program.
I think Mr. Nielsen, in conversations with me, has indicated doing
the assessment was one of the hardest things he's had to do. He had to
look back at the time he's wasted using methamphetamine.
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It appears at this point he's making his first real attempts to ask for
assistance in overcoming that addiction.

[H]e asked for the Drug Court referral ... [because] he felt he needed that
intense supervision ... certainly a stricter program that regular probation.

(02/02/12 Tr., p.14, L.2 - p.15, L.14.)
Additionally, Mr. Nielsen expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his
actions when making the following statements:
Yes, I have lied a lot about my drug, my past, everything. I didn't want
people to know. I am begging for a chance at this. I don't want this drug
in my life anymore. I put everything I love second and that drug first, and I
lied to myself continuously over and over that I don't have a problem and
there's nothing wrong with me.

(02/02/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-14.)
In sum, Mr. Nielsen's new found insight into his addiction increases the odds that
he would have been able to adhere to the strict requirements of drug court. Therefore,
the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation because drug court
constituted a viable alternative to prison.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Nielsen's Oral Rule 35
Motion Requesting Leniency
Mr. Nielsen argues that the unified sentences of fourteen years, with two years
fixed, and seven years with, three years fixed are unduly harsh when they are viewed in
light of the mitigating factors present in this matter. A motion to alter an otherwise lawful
sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court,
and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally
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imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The
criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appel/ant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting

State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Nielsen does not allege that his

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Nielsen must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985).
As a preliminary note, Mr. Nielsen incorporates the mitigating information
contained in Section II, supra, herein by this reference.
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There were mitigating factors before the district court at the time of sentencing
which, when viewed in light of the new information, provide further support for the
conclusion that Mr. Nielsen's sentences are excessive.
support system is a mitigating factor.

Specifically, Mr. Nielsen's

Mr. Nielsen has support from his mother.

(11/08/07 TR., p.12, Ls.19-20; PSI, pp.9-10l She wrote a support letter characterizing
him as a person with a big heart that could easily make other people laugh. (PSI, p.19.)
She wrote another support letter, prior to the probation violation disposition hearing, and
informed the district court that she has stage four terminal cancer which had spread
from her breasts to her bones and lungs. (PSI, p.182.) She also told the district court
that she depended on Mr. Nielsen as her caretaker. (PSI, p.182.) One of Mr. Nielsen's
friends told a presentence investigator that he was a good guy who was willing to take
time with her children. (PSI, p.16.) Mr. Nielsen's father is a successful business owner
and paid Mr. Nielsen's restitution in these matters. (pSI, p.178.)
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Nielsen's oral
Rule 35 motion because of Mr. Nielsen's family support.

Additionally, the support

Mr. Nielsen provides other members of his family provides support for the conclusion
that he does care for other people.

3 The citations to the PSI and the various attachments will adhere to the pagination
contained in the electronic PDF file.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Nielsen

respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of the fixed portion of his
sentence in docket number 39656 from three to two years. Alternatively, Mr. Nielsen
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of his sentences as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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